Submodular linear programs on forests

A general linear programming model for an order-theoretic analysis of both Edmonds' greedy algorithm for matroids and the NW-corner rule for transportation problems with Monge costs is introduced. This approach includes the model of Queyranne, Spieksma and Tardella (1993) as a special case. We solve the problem by optimal greedy algorithms for rooted forests as underlying structures. Other solvable cases are also discussed

An algebraic framework for the greedy algorithm with applications to the core and Weber set of cooperative games

An algebraic model generalizing submodular polytopes is presented, where modular functions on partially ordered sets take over the role of vectors in ${\mathbb R}^n$. This model unifies various generalizations of combinatorial models in which the greedy algorithm and the Monge algorithm are successful and generalizations of the notions of core and Weber set in cooperative game theory. As a further application, we show that an earlier model of ours as well as the algorithmic model of Queyranne, Spieksma and Tardella for the Monge algorithm can be treated within the framework of usual matroid theory (on unordered ground-sets), which permits also the efficient algorithmic solution of the intersection problem within this model. \u

Packing a bin online to maximize the total number of items

A bin of capacity 1 and a nite sequence of items of\ud sizes a1; a2; : : : are considered, where the items are given one by one\ud without information about the future. An online algorithm A must\ud irrevocably decide whether or not to put an item into the bin whenever\ud it is presented. The goal is to maximize the number of items collected.\ud A is f-competitive for some function f if n() f(nA()) holds for all\ud sequences , where n is the (theoretical) optimum and nA the number\ud of items collected by A.\ud A necessary condition on f for the existence of an f-competitive\ud (possibly randomized) online algorithm is given. On the other hand,\ud this condition is seen to guarantee the existence of a deterministic online\ud algorithm that is "almost" f-competitive in a well-dened sense

On some approximately balanced combinatorial cooperative games

A model of taxation for cooperativen-person games is introduced where proper coalitions Are taxed proportionally to their value. Games with non-empty core under taxation at rateɛ-balanced. Sharp bounds onɛ in matching games (not necessarily bipartite) graphs are estabLished. Upper and lower bounds on the smallestɛ in bin packing games are derived and euclidean random TSP games are seen to be, with high probability,ɛ-balanced forɛ≈0.06

Online matching on a line

We prove a lower bound ρ ≥ 9.001 for the competitive ratio of the so-called online matching problem on a line. As a consequence, the online matching problem is revealed to be strictly more difficult than the "cow problem". \u

A Lagrangian relaxation approach to the edge-weighted clique problem

The $b$-clique polytope $CP^n_b$ is the convex hull of the node and edge incidence vectors of all subcliques of size at most $b$ of a complete graph on $n$ nodes. Including the Boolean quadric polytope $QP^n$ as a special case and being closely related to the quadratic knapsack polytope, it has received considerable attention in the literature. In particular, the max-cut problem is equivalent with optimizing a linear function over $QP^n_n$. The problem of optimizing linear functions over $CP^n_b$ has so far been approached via heuristic combinatorial algorithms and cutting-plane methods. We study the structure of $CP^n_b$ in further detail and present a new computational approach to the linear optimization problem based on Lucena's suggestion of integrating cutting planes into a Lagrangian relaxation of an integer programming problem. In particular, we show that the separation problem for tree inequalities becomes polynomial in our Lagrangian framework. Finally, computational results are presented. \u

Note on VCG vs. Price Raising for Matching Markets

In \cite{EK10} the use of VCG in matching markets is motivated by saying that in order to compute market clearing prices in a matching market, the auctioneer needs to know the true valuations of the bidders. Hence VCG and corresponding personalized prices are proposed as an incentive compatible mechanism. The same line of argument pops up in several lecture sheets and other documents related to courses based on Easley and Kleinberg's book, seeming to suggest that computing market clearing prices and corresponding assignments were \emph{not} incentive compatible. Main purpose of our note is to observe that, in contrast, assignments based on buyer optimal market clearing prices are indeed incentive compatible

A note on perfect partial elimination

In Gaussian elimination it is often desirable to preserve existing zeros (sparsity). This is closely related to perfect elimination schemes on graphs. Such schemes can be found in polynomial time. Gaussian elimination uses a pivot for each column, so opportunities for preserving sparsity can be missed. In this paper we consider a more flexible process that selects a pivot for each nonzero to be eliminated and show that recognizing matrices that allow such perfect partial elimination schemes is NP-hard